READING #2 - Part I

from: Senses of Place
Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1997.

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How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time

Phenomenological Prolegomena

Edward S. Casey

All existing things are either in place or not without place.
—*Archytas, as cited by Simplicius*

The power of place will be remarkable.
—*Aristotle,* Physics, *Book IV*

Space is a society of named places.
—*Claude Lévi-Strauss,* The Savage Mind

Nothing could extinguish the fact and claim of estate.
—*W. E. H. Stanner, "Aboriginal Territorial Organization"*

It is sensible, perhaps even irresistible, to assume that human experience begins with space and time and then proceeds to place. Are not space and time universal in scope, and place merely particular? Can place do anything but specify what is already the case in space and time? Or might it be that place is something special, with its own essential structures and modes of experience, even something universal in its own way?

These are questions I shall address in this chapter, and I will do so by way of phenomenology. The insistently descriptive character of the phenomenological enterprise in philosophy rejoins the emphasis in anthropology on precise description in the field (which has never prevented considerable speculation in the chair!). There is much more that could be said about the convergence of anthropology and phenomenology, but in the limitations of this essay I shall attempt only to show how phenomenology as I practice it treats the question of place; anthropological implications will be adumbrated but nowhere fully pursued.

Phenomenology began as a critique of what Husserl called the "natural attitude," that is, what is taken for granted in a culture that has been influenced predominantly by modern science—or, more precisely, by scientism and its many offshoots in materialism, naturalism, psychologism, and so forth. (And anthropologism: in the Prolegomena to his *Logical Investigations* [1970], Husserl addresses "transcendental anthropologism.")

One belief endemic to the natural attitude concerns the way places relate to what is commonly called "space." Once it is assumed (after Newton and Kant) that space is absolute and infinite as well as empty and a priori in status, places become the mere apportionings of space, its compartmentalizations.

Indeed, that places are the determinations of an already existing monolith of Space has become an article of scientific faith, so much so that two recent books in anthropology that bear expressly on place—both quite valuable works in many regards—espouse the view that place is something *posterior to space*, even *made from space*. By "space" is meant a neutral, pre-given medium, a tabula rasa onto which the particularities of culture and history come to be inscribed, with place as the presumed result. We find this view, for example, in James F. Weiner's richly suggestive ethnography of the Foi of Papua New Guinea, *The Empty Place*: "A society's place names schematically image a people's intentional transformation of their habitat from a sheer physical terrain into a pattern of historically experienced and constituted space and time. . . . The bestowing of place names constitutes Foi existential space out of a blank environment" (Weiner 1991:32).

The idea of transformation from a "sheer physical terrain" and the making of "existential space"—which is to say, place—out of a "blank environment" entails that to begin with there is some empty and innocent spatial spread, waiting, as it were, for cultural configurations to render it placeful. But when does this "to begin with" exist? And where is it located? Answers to both questions will generate a vicious regress of the kind at stake in Kant's first antinomy: to search for a first moment in either time or space is to incur shipwreck on the shoals of Pure Reason.[1]

Or consider the following claim from Fred R. Myers's otherwise remarkable ethnography of desert aboriginal people of Central Australia, *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self*: "The process by which space becomes 'country,' by which a story gets attached to an object, is part of the Pintupi habit of mind that looks behind objects to events and sees in objects a sign of something else" (Myers 1991:67). Here we are led to ask, What are these "objects" behind which events lurk and to which stories get attached? The neutrality of the term *object* suggests that the first-order items in the universe are denuded things—denuded of the very "secondary qualities" (in the demeaning term of Galilean-Cartesian-Lockian discourse) that would make them fit subjects of events and stories. We wonder, further, what is this "process by which space becomes 'country,'" by which space is "culturalized," and by which "impersonal geography" becomes "a home, a *ngurra*" (Myers 1991:54).[2]

Myers intimates that all such transformations are a matter of the "projection"—or, alternatively, of the "reproduction"—of determinate social actions and structures. "Country" is the system of significant places as specified by the Dreaming, which represents "a projection into symbolic space of various social processes" (Myers 1991:47). And the structure of the Dreaming in turn—a structure isomorphic with the landscape of the country—is "a product of the way Pintupi society reproduces itself in space and time" (Myers 1991:48). The phrase "in space and time" is telling: the reproduction is in some preexisting medium. Having no inherent configurations of its own, this presumptively empty medium must be populated after the fact (but the fact of what? what fact?) by processes that impute to empty space the particularities that belong to the Dreaming. Generality, albeit empty, belongs to space; particularity, albeit mythic, belongs to place; and the twain meet only by an appeal to a procedure of superimposition that is invoked ex post facto.

But the Pintupi themselves think otherwise, as Myers himself avers: "To the Pintupi, then, a place itself with its multiple features is logically prior or central" (Myers 1991:59). Whom are we to believe? The theorizing anthropologist, the arsenal of his natural attitude bristling with explanatory projectiles that go off into space? Or the aborigine on the ground who finds this ground itself to be a coherent collocation of pre-given places—pre-given at once in his experience and in the Dreaming that sanctions this experience? For the anthropologist, Space comes first; for the native, Place; and the difference is by no means trivial.

It is not, of course, simply a matter of choosing between the anthropologist's vantage point and that of the natives—as if the Pintupi had chosen to participate in a debate on the comparative primacy of space versus place. Nor is any such primacy Myers's own express concern. As an anthropologist in the field, his task is not to argue for space over against place but to set forth as accurately as possible what being-in-place means to the Pintupi. Just there, however, is the rub: even when treating a culture for which place is manifestly paramount, the anthropologist leans on a concept that obscures what is peculiar to place and that (by an implicit cultural fiat) even implies its secondariness. The anthropologist's theoretical discourse—in which the priority of space over place is virtually axiomatic—runs athwart his descriptive commitment.

The question is not so much *whom* we are to believe—both anthropologist and natives are trustworthy enough—but *what* we are to believe. Are we to believe that human experience starts from a mute and blank "space" to which placial modifiers such as "near," "over there," "along that way," and "just here" are added, sooner or later: presumably sooner in perception and later in culture? Or are we to believe that the world comes configured in odd protuberances, in runs, rills, and flats, in *fele*

and *do:m*, as the Kaluli might put it (Feld, this volume)—all of which are traits of places? (Ironically, in this view flatness and, more generally, "featurelessness" belong to place to begin with.)

I take the second view as just stated to be both more accurate as a description and more valuable as a heuristic in the understanding of place. In doing so, I join not only the Pintupi and the Kaluli but also certain early and late figures in Western thought. Both Archytas and Aristotle proclaimed that place is prior to space, and, more recently, Bachelard and Heidegger have reembraced the conviction. All four thinkers subscribe to what could be called the Archytian Axiom: "Place is the first of all things."[3] In between the ancients and the postmoderns there was a period of preoccupation with space—as well as with time, conceived of as space's cosmic partner. But how may we retrieve a sense of the priority of place by means other than arguing from authority (as I have just done in citing certain congenial Western thinkers) or arguing against authority (as occurs when modern science is pilloried, which Husserl does in attacking the natural attitude)?

My suggestion is that we can retrieve such a sense by considering what a phenomenological approach to place might tell us. Even if such an approach is not without its own prejudicial commitments and ethnocentric stances, it is an approach that, in its devotion to concrete description, has the advantage of honoring the actual experience of those who practice it. In this regard it rejoins not only the anthropologist in the field but the native on the land: both have no choice but to begin with experience. As Kant insisted, "there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience" (1950 [1787]: B1).

For Kant, *to begin with* means *to be instigated by*. Thus he must add the qualification that "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience" (Kant 1950 [1787]: B1). Knowledge of any rigorous sort does not *derive from* experience. Kant makes this perfectly clear in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, arguably the first theoretical treatise on anthropology in the West: "General knowledge must always precede local knowledge . . . [because] without [general knowledge], all acquired knowledge can only be a fragmentary experiment and not a science."[4] This paradigmatic Enlightenment statement sets the stage—indeed, still holds the stage in many ways—for the idea that space precedes place. Space, being the most pervasive of cosmic media, is considered that about which we must have general knowledge, whereas we possess merely local knowledge about place.

But what if things are the other way around? What if the very idea of space is posterior to that of place, perhaps even derived from it? What if local knowledge—which, in Geertz's appropriately pleonastic locution, "presents locally to locals a local turn of mind" (1983:12)—precedes knowledge of space? Could place be general and "space" particular? Phenomenology not only moves us to ask these impertinent anti-Enlightenment questions but also provides reasons for believing that the answers to them are affirmative.

In a phenomenological account, the crux in matters of place is the role of perception. Is it the case, as Kant believes (along with most modern epistemologists), that perception provides those bare starting-points called variously "sensations," "sense data," "impressions," and so forth? Or is something else at work in perception that conveys more about place than mere sensory signals can ever effect? It is certainly true—and this is what Kant emphasizes in the idea of "beginning with"—that sensory inputs are the *occasions* of the perception (eventually the knowledge) of concrete places. These impingements—as connoted in the term *Empfindungen*, Kant's word for "sensations"—alert us to the fact that we are perceiving, and they convey certain of the very qualities (including the secondary qualities) of the surfaces of what we perceive. But their pointillistic character ill equips them for supplying anything like the sense of *being in a place*. Yet we do always find ourselves in places. We find ourselves in them, however different the places themselves may be and however differently we construe and exploit them. But how do we grasp this *in* of being in a particular place: this preposition which is literally a "pre-position" inasmuch as we are always already in a place, never not emplaced in one way or another?[5]

If perception is "primary" (as both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty insist), then a significant part of its primariness must be its ability to give to us more than bits of information about the phenomenal and epiphenomenal surfaces of things—and more, too, than a conviction that we are merely in the presence of these surfaces. Beyond what Husserl calls the "hyletic" factor, and Merleau-Ponty, "sensing," there must be, as an ingredient in perception from the start, a conveyance of what being in places is all about. Merleau-Ponty considers this conveyance to be *depth*—a "primordial depth" that, far from being imputed to sensations (as Berkeley [1934], for example, had held), already situates them in a scene of which we ourselves form part. Husserl's way of putting it is that "every experience has its own horizon" and that we continually find ourselves in the midst of perceptual horizons, both the "internal" horizons of particular things (i.e., their immediate circumambience) and the "external" horizons that encompass a given scene as a whole.[6]

But precisely as surrounded by depths and horizons, the perceiver finds herself in the midst of an entire teeming place-world rather than in a confusing kaleidoscope of free-floating sensory data. The coherence of

perception at the primary level is supplied by the depth and horizons of the *very place* we occupy as sentient subjects. That is why we can trust this coherence with what Santayana (1955) called "animal faith," and Husserl (1982: section 103), "primal belief (*protodoxa*)." We come to the world—we come into it and keep returning to it—as already placed there. Places are not added to sensations any more than they are imposed on spaces. Both sensations and spaces are themselves emplaced from the very first moment, and at every subsequent moment as well.

There is no knowing or sensing a place except by being in that place, and to be in a place is to be in a position to perceive it. Knowledge of place is not, then, subsequent to perception—as Kant dogmatically assumed—but is ingredient in perception itself. Such knowledge, genuinely local knowledge, is itself experiential in the manner of *Erlebnis*, "lived experience," rather than of *Erfahrung*, the already elapsed experience that is the object of analytical or abstract knowledge. (Kant, significantly, speaks only of *Erfahrung*.) Local knowledge is at one with lived experience if it is indeed true that this knowledge is of the localities in which the knowing subject lives. To live is to live locally, and to know is first of all to know the places one is in.

I am not proposing a merely mute level of experience that passively receives simple and senseless data of place. Perception at the primary level is synesthetic—an affair of the whole body sensing and moving. Thanks to its inherent complexity, bodily perceiving is directed at (and is adequate to) things and places that come configured, often in highly complicated ways. Moreover, the configuration and complication are already meaningful and not something internally registered as sensory givens that lack any sense of their own: the sensory is senseful. Nor does the inherent meaningfulness of what we perceive require the infusion of determinate concepts located higher up the epistemic ladder. The perceived possesses a core of immanent sense, a "noematic nucleus" in Husserl's technical term (1982: section 91). Because this senseful core is actively grasped, it follows that perception is never entirely a matter of what Kant calls "receptivity," as if the perceiving subject were merely passive. Not only is primary perception inseparable from myriad modes of concrete action, but it is itself "a kind of *passivity in activity*" (Husserl 1973:108; his italics). To perceive synesthetically is to be actively passive; it is to be absorptive yet constitutive, both at once.

It is also to be *constituted:* constituted by cultural and social structures that sediment themselves into the deepest level of perception. The primacy of perception does not mean that human sensing and moving are precultural or presocial. No more than perception is built up from atomic sensations is it constructed from brute givens unaffected by cultural practices and social institutions. On the contrary: these practices and institutions pervade every level of perception, from the quite implicit (e.g., tacitly grasped outer horizons) to the extremely explicit (e.g., the thematic thing perceived). The permeation occurs even—indeed, especially—when a given perception is preconceptual and prediscursive. To be not yet articulated in concept or word is not to be nonculturally constituted, much less free from social constraints. Hence, the primacy of perception does not entail the priority of perception to the givens of culture or society, as if the latter were separable contents of our being and experience: these givens become infusions into the infrastructures of perception itself. The primacy of perception is ultimately a primacy of the lived body—a body that, as we shall see in more detail later, is a creature of habitual cultural and social processes.

But perception remains as *constitutive* as it is constituted. This is especially evident when we perceive places: our immersion in them is not subjection to them, since we may modify their influence even as we submit to it. This influence is as meaningful as it is sensuous. Not only is the sensuous senseful, it is also placeful. As Feld (this volume) puts it, "as place is sensed, senses are placed; as places make sense, senses make place." The dialectic of perception and place (and of both with meaning) is as intricate as it is profound, and it is never-ending.

Given that we are never without perception, the existence of this dialectic means that we are never without emplaced experiences. It signifies as well that we are not only *in* places but *of* them. Human beings—along with other entities on earth—are ineluctably place-bound. More even than earthlings, we are placelings, and our very perceptual apparatus, our sensing body, reflects the kinds of places we inhabit. The ongoing reliability and general veracity of perception (a reliability and veracity that countenance considerable experiential vicissitudes) entail a continual attunement to place (also experienced in open-ended variation). But if this is true, it suggests that place, rather than being a mere product or portion of space, is as primary as the perception that gives access to it. Also suggested is the heretical—and quite ancient—thought that place, far from being something simply singular, is something general, perhaps even universal: a thought to which we shall return.

> Nature makes itself specific.
> —*Kant, The Critique of Judgment*

It is characteristic of the modern Western mind to conceive of space in terms of its formal essence—hence the insistent search for mathematical expressions of pure spatial relations. For Newton, More, Gassendi,

READING #2 – Part II

from: Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Eds. Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004.

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Mapping the Earth in Works of Art

Edward S. Casey

My non-sites are like large, abstract maps made into three dimensions. You are thrown back onto the site. . . . The site is a place you can visit.
—Robert Smithson, "Earth" (1969)

1.

"Mapping the Earth in Works of Art": I start from this rather pretentious title to signal a more generous sense of what art can be in relation to the earth and to be this when considered as a mode of mapping. This is an odd venture, to be sure. How can mapping, which supposedly measures the earth in the greatest possible exactitude, join up with art, which takes up the earth (when it takes it up at all) in its inexact amplitude?

As a preliminary step, let me distinguish four basic kinds of mapping:

(a) *Cartography* is the effort to represent a given region of the earth (or its seas) in accordance with the highest precision known at any given historical moment, whether this be by means of grids (as already in ancient Chinese mapping), rhumb lines in the late Middle Ages, meridians and parallels and Mercator projections in the early modern period, or infrared photography as at present. Styles and techniques change in the history of cartography, but the attempt is always to provide representations that are at once perspicuous in image and consistent in symbolism, while being at the same time reliable and useful for anyone undertaking exploration or travel. For us today an ordinary Rand McNally atlas is the most widely available exemplar of cartography.

(b) *Chorography.* Where cartography reflects its Latin root in *c(h)artus,* papyrus, sheet, page—thus a surface of representation on which more or less accurate images or signs can be inscribed—"chorography" embodies its origin in Greek *chóra,* 'matrix', 'countryside', and above all 'region'. A thriving discipline until the middle of the nineteenth century, chorography is the mapping of *regions* of the earth, whether as defined by national or state borders or by natural configurations such as mountains or rivers. If it has undergone demise as a special industry, the rise of ecological awareness has encouraged the return of chorography in the form of maps that depict bioregions.

(c) *Topography* is the mapping of particular *places:* cities, counties, and other determinate localities. This, too, was once a distinct discipline, most strikingly in early modern Dutch and German etchings of the streets and even the individual buildings of a *Stadt* or *Ortschaft* itself, often viewed from outside the city walls or from above the city itself. Topography survives in those bland and bare representations that show only the major arteries and public areas of a certain city: downtown Indianapolis, greater St. Louis.

(d) *Body-mapping.* With this a fourth kind of mapping we leave behind altogether what is traditionally regarded as a map in the first three senses. This first emerges in abstract expressionist paintings wherein the artist's body is not merely an immediate instrument for mixing paint and holding a brush, etc., but becomes itself a means for mapping the very place which is its ostensible subject matter. The artist's body, as a whole moving mass, displays its sense of the place it paints, first in its gesticulations and then in the ensuing painted image. The gesticulations already incorporate into the body a sense of the circumambient landscape. Just as this landscape is retraced in bodily motions, so these same motions leave traces on the canvas that, rather than *representing* the landscape's precise contours, *reimplace* them on the pictorial surface. The artist who does this most effectively and dramatically is Willem de Kooning, especially in his abstract landscapes of the late 1950s and 1960s such as "Woman in the Landscape" and "Door to the River."

In paintings like these, the artist's phantom body seems to be spread out over the landscape, reinstating it by its very motions, and thereby giving us a sense of what the land (or water) feels like from close up, as the body caresses the surface of the earth. Such a body, in such paintings, *maps out* the landscape (or seascape) by extending itself into its distinctive configurations—in contrast with other more conventional forms of mapping, which in a reverse directionality map the land (or sea) back *into* the representational surface, containing it there. Instead, the body of the painter-mapper bursts the bonds of representation and projects itself ecstatically onto the landscape that is its subject matter, the materiality of the body rejoining the matter of the earth.

A sign of the divergence between this last kind of mapping and the first three I have identified is found in the fact that the latter easily combine forces, whereas bodily mapping is sui generis. The celebrated map by Nicholas Visscher that hangs on the wall of Vermeer's "The Art of Painting" is at once

cartographic in its precision and chorographic in its representational reach: it shows the Low Countries as a coherent group of places. It is also topographic, since it depicts cityscapes along its right and left margin. A master mapmaker such as Visscher is able to put cartography, chorography, and topography together in one seamless representation. It is difficult to imagine body-mapping as an active partner of these three forms of mapping. Nevertheless, approximations exist, as we see in certain works by Jasper Johns, Mondrian, and Diebenkorn. Johns allows his bodily active painterly gestures to complicate a standard cartographic map of America. Diebenkorn, in his "Ocean Park" series, gives us quasi maps of rural land and sea as if seen from far above, his body suspended over the earth; Mondrian, in contrast, gives an abstracted yet vibrant map of New York City in his "Broadway Boogie Woogie." Johns and Mondrian and Diebenkorn—and De Kooning in a much more radical way—continue the ancient tradition of decorated maps but with the difference that the ornamental element, the fancifully figurative, is allowed to overpower the representation, with the result that the map becomes itself a work of art and the work of art a map. In more traditional maps, the decorative element remains decorous, being a factor of design deployed for the purpose of embellishment rather than the expression of a lived body in intimate contact with the surrounding landscape. When this expression becomes the primary factor, when land and body become close companions and co-creative forces, mapping of a different order is accomplished: body-mapping.

2.

Let me back up and start again. I take *earth* to be what subtends human experience; in Husserl's phrase, it is the "basis-body" for all more particular bodies that reside in or on it, whether animate or inanimate. Earth stands under the movements of our bodies, the upsurge of organic matter, and the settling down of stone. For all its vulcanism and metamorphic shifts, earth is the guarantor of all that we do on it; its felt immobility puts paltry human motions in their place; it is an ultimate place of places against which we measure the comparative instability and waywardness of whatever we humans and other animals do. Even earthquakes eventually equilibriate.

Land is something else again. Not merely is it the crust of the earth, its surface—whether as soil (for agriculture), as countryside (for viewing and painting), or as property (for possession: as "real estate"). It is also a mediatrix between earth and *world*, which I take to be the communal and historical and linguistic domain of human speech and action. Heidegger, who first underlined the earth/world contrast (albeit in somewhat different terms than I here espouse), significantly failed to single out land in his emphasis on the polemical relationship between earth and world, their unremitting struggle. I have long felt that we cannot leave matters just there—that there is an unacknowledged *Zwischenraum* ("between-space") between the two epicenters of earth and world that cannot be reduced to a *Streitraum* ("space of strife"). *This is land:* the very land that is the basis of landscape painting, earthworks, the photography of nature—and of most mapping. Land is a liminal concept. It is both literally liminal—a *limen* or threshold between earth and sky in our direct experience—and liminal in the more expanded sense that it is the arena in which earth turns toward world and thereby gains a face, a *facies* or 'surface'. Land is not a surface in the sense of a mere covering, for instance, as sheer "topsoil," but, rather, in the richer sense of that which bears out its own depths. As Wittgenstein wrote in *Zettel*, here "the depths are on the surface." And just as land brings earth *out*—out into visibility in that "layout of surfaces" (Gibson) that is the experiential basis of the natural environment—so it allows earth to become imageable in paintings or photographs and intelligible in the historical deeds and language of a given lifeworld.

Land turns earth inside out, as it were, putting its material contents on display, setting them out in particular places, so as to become subject to articulation in language and to play a role in the history of those who live on it. The configuration of the local land of Afghanistan not merely expresses the character of the geological forces beneath as well as furnishing soil for wheat and poppies, but it provides redoubts for various militant forces. Land acts not just to close in (as happens when regarded as a place-of-hiding or as sheer propertied possession) but to open out into a world of public action. That Heidegger misses this middle term—or dissolves it in one or both of his poles—is not accidental. This critical omission reflects his anti-Hegelian effort to eliminate third terms of all kinds and to conceive of human culture in terms of a Heraclitean *polemos;* it also reflects his *own* world-time, the mid-1930s: a time of mounting armed conflict and forced choices, with no compromise allowed—no middle ground, no land that is not *ours* or *theirs*. This is to adopt a dis-landed logic of closed-off options in which the specialness of a given land, as it rises from the earth and is imbued with its own history, is not recognized, much less respected.

Understandable—perhaps—as a response to the terrors of his time, Heidegger's bipolar model is nevertheless ill-equipped to deal with the multiplexity of art works in their creative alliances with maps: a multiplexity that calls for a triadic paradigm of earth/land/world if it is to begin to do justice to the specificity of place in the midst of the work—place in the form of land, the common subject of landscape paintings and of maps.

3.

Land regarded as a link between earth and world acts as the generative axis of two other closely related triads: three kinds of -scape and three kinds of work:

A. *-Scapes.* A *-scape* is a bounded view of a scene of some sort. It is place or region seen from somewhere by a looking body, a somebody who is acting on his or her epistemophiliac interest, a curiosity about and a wish to know better the surrounding world. There are as many -scapes as there are such situations: not just landscapes and seascapes but skyscapes and cityscapes, even peoplescapes and buildingscapes (the sudden destruction of which latter in lower Manhattan was central to the horror of September 11). There are three traits of *any* -scape: scope, scrape, sheath.

(i) "Scope" signifies the exhibited breadth and depth of any given perceptual scene, its extensivity or outspread, its range. This is a resolutely visual parameter, and it includes a factor of active looking: "scoping out," as we say. To scope out is to seek out the limits of a perceptual scene, whether these limits be the walls of the building in which we are located or the horizon of the landscape in which we are placed.

(ii) By "scrape" I refer to the action of digging into a surface, scooping out this surface literally or figuratively, and leaving traces there: marking it down. If scoping out is the preliminary action of sensing what the boundaries of a given situation are, marking down what we find allows us to fix the features we discover. It is an essentially linear action that can occur by setting stones into the earth to establish property lines—or else by the drawing of literal lines in engravings of the landscape. It is also integral to maps, which consist in congeries of lines etched on the surface of a cartographic, chorographic, or topographic representation, or (in the case of body-maps) gesticular lines of movement traced upon a canvas that stands in for (without attempting to represent) the circumambient landscape.

(iii) "Sheath" names a group of qualities or things that act as an enclosing surface. We perceive a -scape of any kind in terms of fascicles of particular items, each with its own distinctive set of traits: trees and hills, buildings and streets, even the waves of the sea. Not unlike *chóra* in Plato's *Timaeus*, these clusters present themselves as more or less coherent *Gestalten* which, taken together, constitute the surface of what we perceive at any given moment. The world is rarely if ever entirely helter-skelter in its appearance; it comes sheathed, as it were, in bundles of like entities, or at least of entities gathered together in turn in the same region.

As a matter of scope, as sheathed in its surface effects, and as calling for the scraping motions that will specify or represent it, every -scape, every placescape, singles out a portion of the known world, the *oikuméné* (as Greek cartographers called the mapped world). Each such -scape presents part of this world, where "part" signifies integral feature and not detachable piece: *Teil* rather than *Stück*. More exactly, each landscape (or seascape or cityscape: all varieties of placescape) is what Merleau-Ponty calls a "total part": a part that adumbrates and finally includes the whole as if by massive condensation or

concentration. This accounts for the sense that by looking into a given -scape, however delimited, we somehow grasp the earth or the world as a whole: that we are not just seeing *this* particular part, rich or dense as it may be, but a larger totality—here detotalized in a regional fragment. The result is precisely what I would call "earthscape" and "worldscape," the two primary modalities of all placescapes:

Earthscape is the earth construed under a certain aspect, its detotalized totality as viewed from somewhere in particular, or else in a representation that depicts it in terms of a region or set of places. Characterizing every earthscape is its sheer stability, the sense that it will remain after any experience or representation of it; the bearing up of the earth under our living and looking bodies, its always being under foot; the earth-arc: not the horizon but the receding of earth as it recedes *toward* the horizon from the place where we are viewing it; a factor of closure, whereby it always reaches a more or less determinate end, whether effected by the horizon or by the limits of a region; and its sheer materiality, as this presents itself in the form of mega-things such as mountains or miniscule items such as bushes.

Worldscape, in contrast, is a non-enclosed, ever-expanding totality. What matters in a worldscape is the opening up and opening out of a scene, a panoramic sense of unending space (and sometimes also time). Instead of the stability and subtendance operative in an earthscape, its very gravity, here there is an alleviated and even ethereal aspect: as if the perceiver's look could go on and on and on. In an earthscape I am always situated just *here*, where my lived body is located, and acutely aware of how much what is over *there* opposes me as a *Gegen-stand* or would be arduous to reach in the form of literal "countryside," a word in which we can hear "contra." On the other hand, in a worldscape I feel that I am already over there, out there, at the horizon or beyond: the limited has become the undelimited, the heavy the light, the supportive the unsupported. It is the difference between Constable or Rousseau on the one hand, and, say, Cézanne or Pieter Breughel on the other: the former two painters securely locate us and even confine us, the latter open our gaze onto a veritable world of possibilities beyond those actually represented.

Despite the manifest differences between such painters—and despite the conceptual differences between earthscape and worldscape to which I have just pointed—we would still say that each of them offers to us a *landscape* in some significant sense. This is surely a striking fact. It is as if "landscape" continues to exhibit the same power of intermediacy which I have ascribed to land in relation to earth and world. Whatever the undeniable differences of -scapic genre to which earth- and worldscapes give rise, any particular landscape painting will to some significant degree combine traits of both: the stability as well as the ethereality, the bearing up from below as well as the opening out beyond the ostensible boundaries. The same is true of the perceived landscape: it exhibits both tellurian and cosmic dimensions, parts that

close in on themselves and factors that move ever outward such as the sky or the horizon—not surprisingly, for it is precisely land that links the two dimensions, being the mediatrix of their very difference. The partialism of every -scape—of earthscape as self-enclosed and bogging down, of worldscape as ungrounded in its very outgoingness—is redressed in the embrace of landscape, perceived as well as painted. Being itself a view, landscape has its own partiality—its own scope and mode of sheathing, its own schematic signature—but it is itself a total partiality that encompasses that from which it is nevertheless distinguished.

B. *Works*. "Earthworks" and "worldworks" also meet in the middle term of "landworks." By "earthworks" I refer mainly to such prehistoric constructions as burial mounds or ziggurats—all that Hegel would call "symbolic" in their outsize (and now empty) power. But the Nazca lines and the pyramids are also literal earthworks, fashioned as they are from the earth itself. "Worldworks," in contrast, are of cosmic scope and find their paradigmatic instances in star charts and maps of the whole world as we know it at any given historical moment. If the prototypical period of earthworks is that of the pre-modern, that of worldworks is the modern era—when knowledge of the non-European world became the obsession of many European nations.

Post-modern in contrast are "landworks," which I construe as those imaginative artworks which have been created by artists such as Robert Smithson or Michael Heizer or Andy Goldsworthy, each of whom creates artworks set in extraordinary locations and often made from equally unusual materials (leaves, branches, ice: anything to hand in Goldsworthy's case). Such landworks are not only of contemporary art-historical interest but manage to combine, in innovative manners, features of earth- and worldworks, and are often works of art and maps at the same time (as Smithson, for one, has affirmed). They truly map the earth in works of art by virtue of modifying the surrounding landscape in ways that challenge our accustomed modes of visual experience.

4.

After so much distinguishing and ranging as broadly as I have done in this chapter, I would like to draw some at least provisional conclusions. I shall do so in six points.

1. My primary distinctions—after a preliminary survey of four modes of mapping—concerned the two parameters of -scape and work. In each case I contrasted an earthly and a worldly species, and then argued that landscapes and landworks manage to negotiate otherwise diremptive differences. Moreover, the very ideas of "-scape" and "work" are themselves importantly complementary in character. A work intensifies what is already happening in a -scape of any kind. It does so by re-materialization, as it were. The working of the work is hand-work and tool-work—arduous body-work—but it is also and above all vision (design and plan but also inspiration) on the part of artists or mapmakers alike. These various creative manners of working shape and reshape what is already delivered spontaneously to the artist's or mapmaker's perceiving body in any given -scaped experience: and every human experience is so -scaped. It is as if the insertion of the lived body into the perceived world, its fragile position on earth, calls for the work of painting or mapping to consolidate and configurate what would be at once too confined and too confused to count as an artwork or mapwork at this most primitive level of human experience. This model is not polemical: -scapified experience and the work that ensues or intervenes are not engaged in a battle with each other but, instead, solicit each other and reach their own optimal state only in conjunction with the other pole. Between the poles there is tension and difference but not strife. *Methexis*, not *polemos*, rules.

2. An alliance of another kind occurs between work and world. This is an Arendtian theme, but now transferred from the publicity of the *polis* to the shared intimacy of aesthetic experience. Both work and world infuse cultural/historical/political dimensions into art. The -scapic—the bodily, especially in its visuality—carries the earth into the work: that is its distinctive contribution. But the work would not be altogether a *work* were it just the reworking of what perceiving (and especially viewing) offer, whether first- or second-hand. The contribution of world is to take the transmission of what has been sensed -scapically and reshape it in terms of a local or (in our time increasingly) a global culture: which means to make its expressivity sufficiently articulate to render it transmissible to others and not just to one's sensing body. *This is to make it (into) a world:* fashioning both its own world of more or less coherent meaning and linking it to other worlds as well (i.e., the worlds of others as well as other kinds of worlds such as literary or cinematic or art-historical worlds, not to mention culturally diverse worlds).

3. Let me make it clear that I am not rejecting Heidegger's framework of earth and world as the ultimate epicenters of art but am letting it stay in place to show how, at every turn, it must be supplemented—and, finally, how it is undermined from within. It is supplemented by pointing to the way in which the earth pole is not a single place or force but itself gathers several factors in its midst: most notably, the -scapic modalities as realized by the active agency of the lived body. The world pole in turn is constructively complicated by recognizing its affinity with work and vision. In this way we start to fill out what remains abstract and formulaic in "The Origin of the Work of Art": for example, world as "the openness of the Open" or earth as the "self-seclusive." What is called for is a much more resolute commitment to the concreteness of art—and of mapping as its long-lost cousin.

To honor this commitment, I introduced the admittedly awkward nomenclature of the "-scapic," which signifies the very particular ways in which such

downright specific actions as scoping out, marking down, and sheathing are accomplished. "Work," by the same token, points to quite specific means of grappling with materials and views, media and intentionalities. Heidegger himself has shown this brilliantly in his analysis of the work-world in *Being and Time*—a world set up by the stringencies of the ready-to-hand and its complex entourage of references and regions.

It is not accidental, then, that I singled out the régimes of the -scapic and the work (indicating their various avatars) in the middle part of this essay. This was a way of showing that any theory of art necessitates these régimes, both singly and finally together. They hang together by virtue of the fact that each is a modality of the lived body, one pointing to its dynamism of vision and the other to its powers of making. Seeing is accomplished by the seeing *eye*, however culturally informed this eye may be; and working is effected by the skillful *body*, however much a creature of *habitus* this body always is. Each serves to *singularize* the body in its central role of putting the work of art together, witnessing it once it has been created, and (in most cases) offering it to some real or potential public.

4. I have argued that, beyond earth and world (and now admitting their complications and concretions), there is a factor neglected by Heidegger—and most other Continentalists who have written on art. This is *land*, which in effect deconstructs the dyad of earth and world from within. Land is a middle term, a mediatrix as odd and upsetting, as metaphysically untenable, as Platonic *chóra*. (Indeed, they are related through the linguistic fact that *chóra* can mean 'country' *or* 'countryside'.) Land undeniably relates closely both to earth and to world: earth subtends it from below, world extends it above. But it has its own unique form of being as depth-in-surface. It is the basis of the places and regions that fill out earthscapes; and it makes possible the worlds that are established in its midst—in cities and cultures, languages and traditions, thereby creating worldscapes. It is the primal scene in which concresce tellurian forces downward and cosmic directions outward. It is itself always singular: it is always just *this* land, located in this particular place and region and nowhere else. We are lucky to have it: no wonder we crave it so much and miss it so much when we have lost it—not just in its sheer materiality (i.e., as soil or property), but in the phenomenological fact that it is the inner frame for all outgoing and ongoing perception, a basis for personal as well as public identities: just where we are, after all, has much to do with just who we are.

5. One virtue of the model I am here proposing is that it includes not only traditional forms of art—painting, photography, sculpture, architecture—but also newer avatars such as installations and (what is called conventionally) earthworks. These latter are landed entities, either directly (as in Heizer's or Smithson's works in Utah and Arizona) or by displacement (as when the floor of a gallery or museum becomes the surrogate of the land without). At the same time, this model allows us to understand why mapping is so closely

affiliated with so many such art forms, traditional or contemporary—why the artist is always mapping out some landscape, perceived or imagined, and why conversely so many maps can be considered artworks. The inner link is effected, once again, by the doublet of -scape and work as enacted by the human body. An apogee is reached, once again, in the extraordinary case of body-mapping as practiced by de Kooning or Diebenkorn, Johns or Mondrian.

The case of mapping, less pondered by philosophers, calls for extra emphasis. Every map, however ambitious its aim (e.g., in the case of what was once called *cosmographia*, "world maps"), still takes up its own point of view and thus has its own -scapic determinacy; and every map is a work, whether realized by hand or by the most advanced technological means. The mere fact that most maps are representational—indeed, are explicitly cartographic in intent—and are meant for practical use should not mislead us: every map is a delimited take on the region *it* represents by means of the work it sets forth. And every map finally reflects some particular bodily engagement, if not that of active exploration, then that of drawing and reproducing. Just as there is no painting or earthwork without bodily performance, so there is no map without some analogue of this same kind of enactment. This becomes overt in body-mapping, but it is tacitly present in chorography and topography—and even, by displacement and sublimation, in the most advanced cartography.

6. I would like to point, finally, to two outcomes of contemporary interest. For one thing, the centrality of land allows us to recognize that every art work—and every map—has significance for environmental issues. If land is indeed the pivot of earth and world, then the manner in which it figures into art and maps will always be revealing: it will present our experience of the natural or built environment to us in novel and suggestive ways that bear instructively on how we are to manage our life on earth. In this sense all art, and all maps, are environmental. For another thing, the conjunction of work and -scape in the landed heart of art and maps means that the factor of place—always at stake in matters of land—regains renewed importance in our appreciation of these two distinctive but not disjunctive modes of human creation. Heidegger's earth is nowhere; it is as unlocated as is the earth of the Gaia hypothesis when this latter becomes metaphysical in scope; his world is equally unplaced: just where is the openness of the Open it offers? The key is place as the "local absolute" in Deleuze and Guattari's language, or as "global locality" in McLuhan's earlier term. This has political and social consequences which we cannot afford to overlook in an age of global capitalism, rampant internationalism, and equally rampant terrorism. In this age we need to find, and to valorize, a delimited middle region where place and space, the singular and the universal, earth and world meet and conjoin not only in the specificity of artworks and mapworks for which I have been pleading here but in public actions and social works that are equally sensitive to the specificity of land.