localities, such as street corners and architectural landmarks, within the neighborhood space. Objects and places are centers of value. They attract or repel in finely shaded degrees. To attend to them even momentarily is to acknowledge their reality and value. The infant's world lacks permanent objects, being dominated by fleeting impressions. How do impressions, given to us through the senses, acquire the stability of objects and places?

Intelligence is manifest in different types of achievement. One is the ability to recognize and feel deeply about the particular. In distinction to the schematic worlds in which animals live, the schematic worlds of human beings are also richly populated with particular and enduring things. The particular things we value may be given names: a tea set is Wedgewood and a chair is Chippendale. People have proper names. They are particular things and they may well be the first permanent objects in the infant's world of unstable impressions. An object such as a valued crystal glass is recognized by its unique shape, decorative design, and ring when lightly tapped. A city such as San Francisco is recognized by its unique setting, topography, skyline, odors, and street noises.[20] An object or place achieves concrete reality when our experience of it is total, that is, through all the senses as well as with the active and reflective mind. Long residence enables us to know a place intimately, yet its image may lack sharpness unless we can also see it from the outside and reflect upon our experience. Another place may lack the weight of reality because we know it only from the outside—through the eyes as tourists, and from reading about it in a guidebook. It is a characteristic of the symbol-making human species that its members can become passionately attached to places of enormous size, such as a nation-state, of which they can have only limited direct experience.

3
Space, Place, and the Child

Feelings and ideas concerning space and place are extremely complex in the adult human being. They grow out of life's unique and shared experiences. Every person starts, however, as an infant. From the infant's tiny and confused world appears in time the adult's world view, subliminally also confused, but sustained by structures of experience and conceptual knowledge. Although children come under cultural influences as soon as they are born, the biological imperatives of growth nonetheless impose rising curves of learning and understanding that are alike and hence may be said to transcend the specific emphases of culture.

How does a young child perceive and understand his environment? Fairly dependable answers are available. The child's biological equipment, for instance, gives clues as to the limits of his powers. Moreover we can observe how the child behaves in controlled and real-life situations. We may also wonder, what is the feeling tone of the child's world? what is the nature of his attachments to people and to places? Such questions are more difficult to answer. An introspective return to our own childhood is often disappointing, for the bright and dark landscapes of our early years tend to fade while only a few landmarks such as birthdays and the first day at school remain.

This inability, for most people, to recapture the mood of their own childhood world suggests how far the adult's schemata, geared primarily to life's practical demands, differ from those of the child.[1] Yet the child is father to the man, and the adult's perceptual categories are from time to time infused with emotions that surge out of early experiences. These highly charged moments from the past are sometimes captured by poets. Like candid snapshots out of the family album their words recall for us a lost innocence and a lost dread, an immediacy of experience that had not yet suffered (or benefited) from the distancing of reflective thought.

Biology conditions our perceptual world. At birth an infant's cerebral cortex has only about 10 to 20 percent of the normal complement of nerve cells in a mature brain; moreover many of the nerve cells present are not connected with each other.[2] The infant has no world. He cannot distinguish between self and an external environment. He feels, but his sensations are not localized in space. The pain is simply there, and he responds to it with crying; he does not seem to locate it in some specific part of his body. For only a brief time, as infants, human beings have known how it feels to live in a nondualistic world.

During the first few weeks of life the infant's eyes cannot focus properly. Toward the end of the first month the infant is able to fixate an object in the direct line of his vision, and by the end of the second month binocular fixation with convergence begins to appear.[3] However, even in his fourth month the infant shows little interest in exploring the world visually beyond the range of three feet.[4] An infant is immobile and can make only small movements with his head and limbs. Moving the body along a more or less straight line is essential to the experiential construction of space into the basic coordinates of ahead, behind, and sideways. Most mammals, soon after birth, gain a sense of orientation by taking a few steps after their mother. The slow-maturing human child must acquire this skill more gradually.

What events and activities can provide the infant with the feel of space? An infant in the Western world spends much of his time prone. He is occasionally picked up to be burped,

played with, and consoled. Out of these events may come the felt distinction between horizontal and vertical. At the level of activity an infant knows space because he can move his limbs: kicking aside the blanket that encumbers him is a taste of freedom that, in the adult, is associated with the idea of having space. An infant explores the environment with his mouth.[5] The mouth adjusts to the contour of the mother's breast. Sucking is a most rewarding activity, for it requires participation by the different senses of touch, smell, and taste. In addition, sucking feeds the baby, giving him a sense of contentment. The stomach distends and contracts as food is taken in and digested. This physiological function, unlike breathing, is consciously identified with alternating states of distress and bliss. "Empty" and "full" are visceral experiences of lasting importance to the human being. The infant knows them and responds with crying or smiling. To the adult, such commonplace experiences take on an extra metaphorical meaning, as the expressions "my cup runneth over," "I have an empty feeling," and "a full life" suggest. The infant uses his hands to explore the tactile and geometrical characteristics of his environment. While the mouth tackles the nipple and acquires the feel of buccal space, the hands move busily over the breast. Long before the infant's eyes can focus on a small object and discern its shape his hands will have grasped it and known its physical properties through touch.

The visual world of an infant is peculiarly difficult to describe because we are tempted to assign to it the well-known categories of an adult's visual world. How the senses of smell, taste, and touch structure the environment escapes us most of the time; even educated adults lack a varied vocabulary to present olfactory and tactile worlds. But we have no problem with the visual. Pictures and diagrams, as well as words, come to our aid. The world seen through an adult's or older child's eyes is large and vivid; objects in it are clearly ordered in space. Such is not the case for the infant. His visual space lacks structure and permanence. Objects in it are impressions; hence they tend to exist for the infant only so long as they stay in his visual field.[6] The shapes and sizes of objects lack the

constancy that older children take for granted. Piaget notes that an infant may fail to recognize a milk bottle when the wrong end is offered to him; he learns to turn it around when he is about eight months old.[7] To an experienced older child an object looks smaller at a distance, and the diminishment in size of a retreating object is unreflectively transcribed to mean increasing distance. To the infant, however, an object that looks small because it is at a distance may be taken as a different object. The infant does possess an innate capacity to recognize the rough three-dimensional quality of things, their constancy of size and shape, and the distinction between far and near, but the recognition operates within a highly circumscribed field compared with that of a mobile toddler.[8]

The ability to see is strongly supported by nonvisual experiences. Even to an older child the moon overhead is easily considered a different object from the moon on the horizon. That the moon moves around the earth is an abstraction alien to the child's experience: the moon is seen only at specific moments, separated by an interval of time that to the child feels almost eternal. The picture of a road leading to a distant cottage seems easy to interpret; yet the road makes full sense only to someone who has walked on it. An immobile infant can have no sense of distance as the expenditure of energy to overcome spatial barrier. A child quickly learns, however, to read spatial and environmental cues even when they are presented to him in the transcribed form of a picture. A bookish youngster three or four years old can already look at the picture of a footpath disappearing into the woods and see himself as the hero of an impending venture.

The first environment an infant explores is his parent. The first permanent and independent object he recognizes is perhaps another person. While things appear and continue to exist only insofar as he attends to them, the independent reality of an adult, able to dispense or withhold favor, soon intrudes on the child's quickening consciousness.[9] Adults are necessary not only for the child's biological survival, but also for developing his sense of an objective world. An infant a few weeks old has already learned to heed the human presence.

He begins to acquire a sense of distance and direction through the need to judge where a grownup may be. Toward the end of the first month of life an infant is likely to follow with his eyes only one distant percept—the grownup's face. A hungry and crying baby calms down and opens his mouth or makes sucking movements when he sees an adult approaching.

An eight-month-old child is aware of noises, particularly animal and human noises, in the next room. He attends to them; his sphere of interest expands beyond what is visible and of pressing concern. However, his behavioral space remains small. He seems easily discouraged by perceived barriers. According to Spitz, up to about eight months a child's spatial horizon is limited by the bars of his crib, or cot. "Within his cot he grabs toys with ease. If the same toy is offered to him outside the bars of his cot, he reaches for it, but his hands stop at the bars; he does not continue his movements beyond; he could easily do it, for the bars are sufficiently widely spaced. It is as if space ended within his cot. Two or three weeks after the eighth month, however, he suddenly sees the light and becomes able to continue his movement beyond the bars and to grasp his toy."[10]

A crawling baby can explore space. Movement beyond the immediate vicinity of the mother or outside the crib entails risks with which the baby is not prepared to cope. Instincts for survival are not well developed. One that appears between the sixth and the eighth month is fear of the stranger. Prior to this stage the infant makes no distinction between familiar and unfamiliar faces; thereafter he turns his head or cries when a stranger approaches.[11] The inanimate environment provides few unambiguous signals of danger to the intrepid infant explorer. Anything that can be grasped is grasped or put into his mouth for more intimate acquaintance; fear of fire and water has to be learned. To the crawling child horizontal space looks safe. He is aware of one kind of danger in the physical environment: the cliff. Experiments have shown that a baby will not crawl onto a glass plate that extends over a pit with vertical sides despite encouragement from the mother. His eyes respond to cues for sudden changes of slope.[12]

The young child, as soon as he learns to walk, will want to follow his mother and explore the environment within her ambience. The more hostile the environment, the closer the attachment to the protective adult. Bushman babies of southwest Africa, for example, are less ready to stray from the mother in their playful exploration and more ready to run to her than are Western babies.[13] In a study of the outdoor behavior of English children, one and a half to two and a half years old, Anderson notes that they seldom stray more than 200 feet from their mothers. Characteristically the child moves in short bouts of no more than a few seconds. He stops between bouts for similar brief periods. Most of his walking time is spent drawing nearer to or farther from the mother. Objects and events in the environment do not appear to affect the way the child moves. The child does not necessarily move away from the mother because he is attracted by an object nor return to her in flight from an object. The movements have the playful character of experimentation. The child "moves a short distance from the mother, stops to look around, fixates the sources of sounds and visual stimuli and, in some cases, attracts the mother's attention to them. Intermingled with this scanning of the remote is an examination of the ground: he handles leaves, grass, stones and refuse; crawls or jumps backwards and forwards over verges, and attempts the shaking or climbing of obstacles."[14] Pointing is a common gesture. Any remote sight or sound that catches the child's attention is sufficient to elicit it. Often the adult is unable to discern the source of the stimulus. It may be imaginary. "A child will point to a part of the horizon where nothing is moving and tell the mother that a man is coming."[15] Of special interest in these observations is the child's apparent concern with the remote and the proximate. He points to the horizon and plays with stones at his feet, but he shows little interest in the middle ground.

Infants and young children tend to articulate a world in polarized categories. Things are noted and classified on the ground of maximal contrast. Language itself begins when the infant stops babbling indiscriminately and experiments with highly differentiated sounds. The first vowel is the wide open

"a" and the first consonant the restricted "p" or "b" made with the lips. The first consonantal opposition is between nasal and oral stops (mama/papa); next comes the opposition of labials and dentals (papa/tata and mama/nana). Together these comprise the minimal consonantal system for all the languages of the world.[16] Between the sixth and the eighth month, we have noted, the infant begins to divide people into "familiar" and "strange." Shortly after he discriminates among inanimate toys. When toys are placed before him he grabs the one he favors rather than the one closest to him. A one-year-old child, held in the lap, raises his arms to gesture "up"; he wriggles and looks down when he means "down." Spatial opposites are clearly distinguished by a child two to two and a half years old. They include up and down, here and there, far and near, top and bottom, on and under, head and tail, front and back, front door and back door, front buttons and rear buttons, home and outside.[17] A toddler is able to verbalize some of these distinctions. They are not very specific. A young child distinguishes between "home" and "outside" as his play areas rather than "my bedroom" and "garden." The polar extremes are not understood equally well; for example, "here" has greater significance than "there," and "up" is more readily conceived than "down."[18]

The works of Piaget and his colleagues have repeatedly shown that sensorimotor intelligence precedes conceptual grasp, sometimes by several years. In the course of day-to-day activities a child displays spatial skills that are far beyond his intellectual comprehension. An infant six months old can discriminate between a square and a triangle, but the concept of square as a certain shape does not appear until a child is about four years old, when he can also draw it. Again, a young child may have the notion of the straight line as the trajectory of a moving object (the truck he pushes along the edge of the table), but the geometric concept of the straight line does not appear until the age of six or seven.[19] Prior to that age the child does not spontaneously draw a straight line and fails to grasp the idea of the diagonal.[20] A child beginning to walk soon walks to a purpose: he starts from a home base, heads toward the

object of desire, and returns to the starting point by a different route. A vigorous child of three or four knows his way about the house and, from time to time, visits the neighbors. These sensorimotor achievements, however, do not imply a conceptual knowledge of spatial relations. Swiss children, five to six years old, can go to school and return home by themselves. They have difficulty explaining how this is done. One child "remembers only where he starts and where he finishes and that he has to go round a corner on the way. He cannot recall a single landmark, and the journey he draws bears no relation to his plan of the school and the surrounding district." Another child "remembers names of roads, but not their order or the places where he has to turn. His drawing is just an arc with a number of points put in haphazardly to correspond with names he can remember."[21]

A child's spatial frame of reference is restricted. Children's art provides abundant hints of this restriction. For example, in the child's drawing the level of water in a tilted glass tube is shown at right angles to the sides of the tube, rather than as parallel to the surface of the table that provides the horizontal base line for the picture. Or, when a child is asked to draw a chimney on the sloping roof of the house, he may place the chimney at right angles to the sloping roof rather than to the flat ground on which the house rests.[22] "Separation" is another type of evidence that hints at the child's inability to depict, or simply indifference to, the spatial relations among objects. For example, the picture of the cowboy on his horse may show a prominent gap between the cowboy's hat and his head, and another gap between the cowboy and the horse.[23] Errors of this kind suggest that the young child is more concerned with things themselves—the water in the tube, the cowboy, and the horse, than with their precise spatial relations. Parents know how easily their young offspring get lost in an unfamiliar environment. Adults have acquired the habit of taking mental note of where things are and of how to go from one place to another. Children, on the other hand, are caught up in the excitement of people, things, and events; going from one place to another is not their responsibility.

Human beings live on the ground and see trees and houses from the side. The bird's-eye view is not ours, unless we climb a tall mountain or fly in an airplane. Young children rarely have the opportunity to assume a bird's-eye view of landscape. They are small people in a world of giants and of gigantic things not made to their scale. Yet children five or six years old show remarkable understanding of how landscapes look from above. They can read black-and-white vertical aerial photographs of settlements and fields with unexpected accuracy and confidence. They can pick out the houses, roads, and trees on aerial photographs even though these features appear greatly reduced in scale and are viewed from an angle and position unknown to them in actual experience. City children may have benefited from looking at pictures in magazines and television, but country children unexposed to these media are also good at interpreting vertical photographs of their environment.[24]

Perhaps one reason why young children can accomplish these feats of extrapolation is that they have played with toys. Although children are midgets in the world of adults, they are giants in their own world of toys. They look at toy houses and trains from a height and command their fates like Olympian gods. Susan Isaacs reports on a group of precocious English children who quickly learned about spatial relations through imaginative play.

> The children had taken to modelling in plasticine whole scenes of places they had been to, such as the bathing-pool on the river, with the people in it. One day whilst they were modelling some such subject, an aeroplane passed over the garden, as often happened. The children all watched it, and shouted up to it as they usually did, "Come down, come down!". . . . [One child] said, "Perhaps he can see us?" And another, "I wonder what he sees, what we look like." I then suggested, "Perhaps we could make a model of the garden as it looks to the man in the plane?" This suggestion delighted them. We began on it at once and put several days' work into it. Some of the children climbed "as high up the ladder as we can get, to see how it looks from the plane." One boy of four-and-a-half realised spontaneously that from the plane only the tops of their own heads would be seen, and he dotted a number of small flat ovals over the paths of the model, "That's the children running about."[25]

In the period from 1950 to 1970, the ability of children of nursery-school age to understand aerial photographs has improved. Viewing aerial scenes on television and playing with simple constructional toys may have helped this progressive trend. On the other hand, over the same period children show no sign of greater sophistication in understanding viewpoints from opposite sides of a room or field.[26] It is easier for both the child and the adult to imagine how a pilot in his airplane sees the landscape than how a farmer on the opposite side of the hill sees it. We more readily assume a God-like position, looking at the earth from above, than from the perspective of another mortal living on the same level as ourselves. Moreover comprehension of environment suffers less after a 90-degree rotation of perspective from the horizontal than after a rotation of 40 to 50 degrees. The oblique view can be more difficult to interpret than the vertical view.

To the child, the picture taken from the side or at a small angle above ground has one major advantage over the map or aerial photograph: it is a more direct appeal to imaginative action. A child three and a half years old is already able to project himself kinesthetically into the illustration of his book. He looks at a picture and in his imagination he walks the path to the house and worms his way through its tiny door.[27] Central perspective creates an illusion of time and movement in a scene: the converging borders of a road that disappears into the door of a distant house are strong cues to action. In contrast, the vertical photograph invites the understanding of spatial relationships. The child is not prompted to initiate imaginative action—unless it is to drop bombs on the school house. A perspectival picture of the kind that is found in a storybook encourages an egocentric viewpoint: the child sees himself as the hero of the stage and is unable, or unwilling, to imagine how another actor—the little boy at the end of the road, for instance—would see him as he approaches. An aerial photograph or map, on the other hand, promotes an objective viewpoint. An objective viewpoint discourages action, especially those precipitous and self-dramatizing ventures that come naturally to the child.

How does a young child understand place? If we define place broadly as a focus of value, of nurture and support, then the mother is the child's primary place. Mother may well be the first enduring and independent object in the infant's world of fleeting impressions. Later she is recognized by the child as his essential shelter and dependable source of physical and psychological comfort. A man leaves his home or hometown to explore the world; a toddler leaves his mother's side to explore the world. Places stay put. Their image is one of stability and permanence. The mother is mobile, but to the child she nonetheless stands for stability and permanence. She is nearly always around when needed. A strange world holds little fear for the young child provided his mother is nearby, for she is his familiar environment and haven. A child is adrift—placeless—without the supportive parent.[28]

As the child grows he becomes attached to objects other than significant persons and, eventually, to localities. Place, to the child, is a large and somewhat immobile type of object. At first large things have less meaning for him than small ones because, unlike portable toys or security blankets, they cannot be handled and moved easily; they may not be available for comfort and support at moments of crisis. Moreover the child may develop ambivalent feelings toward certain places—large objects—that are his. For example, the high chair is his place. He is fed there and feeding is a source of satisfaction, but he is also fed things he doesn't like and he is imprisoned in his high chair. A child may view his crib with ambivalence. The crib is his cozy little world, but almost every night he goes to it with reluctance; he needs sleep but fears darkness and being left alone.

As soon as the child is able to speak with some fluency he wants to know the names of things. Things are not quite real until they acquire names and can be classified in some way. Curiosity about places is part of a general curiosity about things, part of the need to label experiences so that they have a greater degree of permanence and fit into some conceptual scheme. According to Gesell, at two or two and a half years the child comprehends "where." He has no clear image of the

intervening space between here and there, but he acquires a sense of place and of security when his "where?" is answered with "home," "office," or "big building." A year or so later, the child shows a new interest in landmarks. He recognizes and anticipates them when he is out for a walk or ride. Egocentrism is manifest in a tendency to think that all cars going in his direction must be going to his own place. The child also learns to associate persons with specific places. He is bewildered when he meets his nursery-school teacher downtown, because she seems to him dislocated; she upsets his system of classification.[29]

A child's idea of place becomes more specific and geographical as he grows. To the question, where do you like to play? a two-year-old will probably say "home" or "outdoors." An older child will answer "in my room" or "in the yard." Locations become more precise. "Here" and "there" are augmented by "right here" and "right there." Interest in distant places and awareness of relative distance increase. Thus a child three to four years old begins to use such expressions as "far away" and "way down" or "way off." To the question, where do you live? a two-year-old will probably say "home." A year or so later he may give the street name or even the name of the town, though infrequently.[30]

In elementary school years, how does a child's awareness of place deepen and expand? A study of first- and sixth-grade pupils in two midwestern American communities is suggestive.[31] The children are shown pictures of four types of places that are a part of their larger environment: village, city, farm, and factory. Of each place the question is asked: "What story does this picture tell?" The replies show marked individual differences. In general, those of the older children are much more sophisticated. Village, city, farm, and factory are familiar categories of place to sixth graders; they describe them with an assurance and facility comparable to those of adults. When shown a picture the older pupil is often able not only to say what it is (village, city, etc.), what it consists of, but also to put the place in its larger geographical context; he not only describes what the people shown in the picture are doing (mowing the lawn, shopping, etc.) but also attempts to explain how the place functions. In comparison, the first-grade pupil, when he looks at the picture of the village, is more likely to ignore its broader spatial setting; he may not even recognize it as a village, his attention being focused on its parts—the church, the school, the shop, and the road. The younger child tends to have little to say about the social and economic significance of the things he notices in the picture. Indeed the first grader's primary interest seems not to be the physical environment but the people in it, what the man or the little girl is doing. In general the first grader is less enthusiastic about places than the older child.

The geographical horizon of a child expands as he grows, but not necessarily step by step toward the larger scale. His interest and knowledge focus first on the small local community, then the city, skipping the neighborhood; and from the city his interest may jump to the nation and foreign places, skipping the region. At age five or six a child is capable of curiosity about the geography of remote places. How can he appreciate exotic locales of which he has no direct experience? Learning theory has yet to explain satisfactorily these apparent leaps in comprehension. It is not surprising, however, that a child can enjoy news of distant places, for he leads a rich life of fantasy and is at home in fantasyland before adults require him to dwell imaginatively in the real countries of a geography book. To an intelligent and lively child, experience is active searching and occasional wild extrapolations beyond the given: he is not bound by what he sees and feels in his home and local neighborhood.

What is the character of a young child's emotional tie to place? American first graders may recognize village, city corner, and farm as entities, but we have noted that the young pupils have less to say and are less enthusiastic about such places than is the case with older children. Except for nurseries and playgrounds few public places are made to the scale of young children. Do they feel a need to be in places that conform to their own size? Hints of such need exist. Infants, for example, are known to crawl under the grand piano, where

they sit in an apparent state of bliss. Older children in their play seek out nooks and corners both in man-made environments and in nature. Spending the night in a tent or in a tree house at the backyard is a real treat and as much fun as being taken on a long trip to a real hunting lodge.

Feeling for place is influenced by knowledge, by knowing such basic facts as whether the place is natural or man-made and whether it is relatively large or small. A child five or six years old lacks this kind of knowledge. He may talk excitedly about the city of Geneva and Lake Geneva, but his appreciation of these places is certain to differ radically from that of an informed adult. He is at an age when he is likely to assume that both the city and the lake are artificial. He is also likely to assume they are comparable in size.[32]

Children, at least those of the Western world, develop a strong sense of property. They become strongly possessive. A child declares that certain toys are his, that the chair next to the mother's chair is his place, and he is not slow to defend what he considers to belong to him. Much of the child's combative possessiveness, however, is not evidence of genuine attachment. It arises out of a need for assurance of his own worth and for a sense of status among peers. An object or a corner of the room, valueless to the child one moment, suddenly becomes valuable when another child threatens to take possession. Once the first child has regained indisputable control, his interest in the toy or place quickly wanes.[33] This is not to deny that people, young and old, feel a need to anchor their personality in objects and places. All human beings appear to have personal belongings and perhaps all have need of a personal place, whether this be a particular chair in a room or a particular corner in a moving carriage.

Robert Coles believes that in the United States the children of migrant farm workers suffer because, among other reasons, they have no place that they can identify as their own over a period of time. Peter, for example, is a seven-year-old boy who travels up and down the East coast with his working parents. They seldom stay long in any farm. Peter helps to pick fruits and vegetables. He goes to school when he can. Coles writes:

> To a boy like Peter a school building, even an old and not very attractively furnished one, is a new world—of large windows and solid floors and doors and plastered ceilings and walls with pictures on them, and a seat that one has, that one is given, that one is supposed to own, or virtually own, for day after day, almost as a right of some sort. After his first week in the first grade Peter said this: "They told me I could sit in that chair and they said the desk, it was for me, and that every day I should come to the same place, to the chair she said was mine for as long as I'm there in that school—that's what they say, the teachers, anyway."[34]

Place can acquire deep meaning for the adult through the steady accretion of sentiment over the years. Every piece of heirloom furniture, or even a stain on the wall, tells a story. The child not only has a short past, but his eyes more than the adult's are on the present and the immediate future. His vitality for doing things and exploring space is not suited to the reflective pause and backward glance that make places seem saturated with significance. The child's imagination is of a special kind. It is tied to activity. A child will ride a stick as though it were a real horse, and defend an upturned chair as though it were a real castle. In reading a book or looking at its pictures he quickly enters a fantasy world of adventure. But a broken mirror or an abandoned tricycle has no message of sadness. And children are baffled when they are asked to interpret the mood of a landscape or landscape painting. People have moods; how can a scene or place look happy or sad?[35] Yet adults, particularly educated adults, have no difficulty associating inanimate objects with moods. Young children, so imaginative in their own spheres of action, may look matter-of-factly on places that to adults are haunted by memories.

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